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Abstract
This paper examines the long-term relationship that arises when external
loans are used to smooth the consumption path of a risk-averse sovereign subject to
endowment shocks. We assume seniority is legally enforced in lender couritries, but
that no third party can enforce sovereign loan contracts. We model the loan market as
a repeated game in which contracts are always subject to renegotiation; the only
credible punishments are renegotiation~proof changes in the path of future transfers.
Simple debt contracts with initial free entry by lenders can support
transfers
that.
.
.
.

achieve permanent consumption smoothing that is efficient, subject to the perfection
constraints.
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SOVEREIGN DEBT RENEGOTIATION IN A
CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING MODEL

BY KENNETH M. KLETZER AND BRIAN D. WRIGHT

1. INTRODUCTION
Respect for sovereign immunity has long been recognized (e.g. Keynes (1924)) as a
crucial constraint on lenders to sovereign states.

The consequences of lenders'

inability to seize collateral are seen in the history of sovereign lending.

Overall

payments on sovereign loans during the past century or so have not come close to
discharging the original contractual obligations, and there have been many defaults as
identified by historians. 1
But though debt service has fallen far short of contractual obligations, lack of
collateral has not meant that lenders did not recover their principal, on average. In
fact, lending to sovereign nations has been, overall, 4uite profitable, with average
returns comparing favorably with those on contemporaneous domestic government
obligations in lender nations. 2 Even loans in default were frequently profitable ex
J2Q.S.1. 3

When payment deviations or defaults occurred, it has been widely noted that
there was generally no abrupt termination of the borrower-lender relationship as seen
in domestic bankruptcy. Instead, "Settlement was achieved on a case-by-case basis
through bilateral negotiation" (Eichengreen and Lindert (1989) p. 8). The relationship
typically continued after renegotiation, with a modified sequence of transfers under the
guise of partial repayments, new loans, debt repurchase, and so on. Indeed all parties
might view a default as "excusable", an equilibrium phenomenon in appropriate states
of the underlying international financial relationship. 4

The equilibrium relationship that underlies the formal contract for a loan to a
sovereign is the subject of our paper. Assuming legal enforcement of lender seniority
but no collateral nor any exogenous punishments for non-performance, we consider
how loans and repayments evolve when neither party to a loan can be forced to honor
past payment commitments.
The first issue that arises is that of motivation.

Why should sovereign

borrowers with no collateral repay their lenders? One rationale, recently advanced by
Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), is to avoid some kind of contemporaneous sanctions such
as interference with intratemporal trade. Cases exist where the existence of this type
of <J,uid pro quo is easy to infer. 5

However, elsewhere in the historical record

(Eichengreen and Portes 1989b), and in the recent experience of Brazil, Ecuador and
Peru (Sachs 1989 p. 26), there is evidence of marked reluctance on the part of lenders
and/or their governments to interfere with a debtor's trade, when they could have done
so as punishment for non-performance on foreign loans.
Another motive for repayment, identified in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), is the
desire of a risk-averse borrower for continuation of a consumption-smoothing
relationship with a lender. We adopt this motive for our model, but we consider
punishments different from the trigger strategy of Eaton and Gersovitz, in which
permanent cutoff of access to the credit market is the penalty of borrower misbehavior.
We assume ex ante commitment by either borrowers or lenders is infeasible. 6
All debt contracts are in general subject to renegotiation, which we define as any
deviation by a party from the terms of the contract or of the associated punishments
for deviations.
For a sovereign borrowing equilibrium to be credible when renegotiation is
feasible, it must be enforced by sufficiently strong punishments that are also credible.
To be credible, the punishments that support the equilibrium given renegotiation must
themselves be consistent with the self-interested choices of the parties jointly, given
2

that one of them has deviated from the equilibrium path (or from a previous
punishment regime). Punishments are credible if they are what would be chosen as a
result of renegotiation; by construction renegotiation will not induce deviation from the
punishment. Such punishments are "renegotiation-proof' by several definitions in the
recent literature (e.g. Farrell and Maskin (1990), Pearce 1987). The trigger strategy
punishment in the model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), reversion to permanent
autarky, is vulnerable to renegotiation since it can be Pareto dominated by other
alternatives when there are positive net transfers in equilibrium; it is not
"renegotiation-proof."
In this paper we characterize the equilibrium paths of the transfers made
between the parties in the course of the consumption smoothing relationship
underlying a succession of simple debt contracts, including the punishment paths that
would be followed in equilibrium after a deviation. The equilibrium transfers are the
result of renegotiation.
In our model, the economy has an infinite horizon, and the risk-averse
borrower's endowment ("income") is exogenous and stochastic each period;
borrowers do not invest domestically. Lenders are risk-neutral and competitive. All
agents have the same information set. 7

In this problem, constrained optimal

smoothing can be implemented with simple debt contracts and a strict seniority
privilege for initial lenders. The ability to renegotiate transforms a formal simple debt
contract into an equilibrium sequence of transfers quite different from what one would
infer from the terms of the formal contract.

Should one party deviate from the

equilibrium, renegotiation implies a new equilibrium path of transfers, a punishment,
that gives the deviant no gain from the deviation.
The operation of smoothing proceeds as intertemporal exchange between the
parties, which can be modeled with only one good. Thus our dynamic model, which
has intertemporal trade consisting of unilateral transfers of a single good under risk
3

aversion, is complementary to the model of Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) in which there
is bilateral contemporaneous exchange of different goods (repayments for freedom
from trade sanctions or from seizure of their traded commodity) under risk neutrality in
a static bargaining equilibrium using the extensive form game of offers and counter
offers proposed by Rubinstein (1982). In departing from a strategic Nash bargaining
model to determine the distribution of surplus in the subgame perfect equilibrium with
renegotiation, we have a precedent in the (quite different) model of Hart and Moore
(1988). 8
Before we proceed with the more technical exposition of the model, we offer an
informal overview of the borrowing-lending relationship with renegotiation in Section
2. An outline of the model follows in Section 3, and renegotiation-proof equilibrium
consumption-smoothing transfer paths are derived in Section 4.

The dynamic

evolution of the equilibrium transfers for given initial conditions, and the dynamic
equilibrium response to deviations by either of the parties, are discussed in Section 5.
Implementation of the renegotiation-proof relationship using simple debt contracts is
described in Section 6, and conclusions follow in Section 7.

2. OVERVIEW

It is easy to see how net transfers between borrower and lender that smooth
the consumption of the risk-averse agent could be Pareto-superior to the complete
absence of transfers in all periods, denoted "permanent autarky" here.

But any

transfers that occur must be supported in an equilibrium in which there is no means of
current enforcement of commitment exogenous to the smoothing activity itself, such as
military power or interference with trade.
The sole motivation for any voluntary unilateral transfer in this model is the
future surplus to be had from continuation on the equilibrium path. Transfers are made
by the borrower or lender only if she or he, by making the transfer, ensures sufficient
4

anticipated future transfers in return. To put this another way, the punishment for
non-cooperation of any party is the loss of the positive net transfers he or she would
receive in equilibrium in different states in the future. Because no party can be forced
to make a transfer to another at any time, the largest penalty for a deviation from an
agreed lending and repayment plan is limited to imposition of permanent autarky.
An equilibrium choice of strategies for all agents must be subgame perfect,
because unilateral deviations are always possible. Therefore, we first restrict our
attention to subgame perfect equilibria (Selten (1965, 1975)). After every possible
history of actions by the lender and by the borrower, the strategy profile for the
remaining repeated game for each is a best response to the strategy profile for the
other. Thus, for punishments to be credible, they must be consistent with the self
interest of the punishing party subsequent to a deviation from the equilibrium path.
That is, execution of the punishment must maximize the present value of surplus
expected by the punishing party, given the history up to that point, and the strategies
adopted by all other agents.
However, subgame perfect equilibria frequently involve strategy choices after
some histories that, although best responses to the other agent's strategy, yield
outcomes Pareto-inferior to other pairs of strategies.

For example, Eaton and

Gersovitz (1981) rely on trigger strategies to support non-trivial financial market
equilibria without renegotiation of repayment obligations in a consumption-smoothing
model. Reversion to credit market autarky is Pareto-dominated by a return to an
initial path which provides some smoothing of borrower consumption across income
states.

If support of an equilibrium path requires a punishment that is Pareto

dominated by an alternative equilibrium path, a commitment technology is implicitly
assumed to make the parties jointly adhere to the dominated path.
commitment, the punishment is subject to renegotiation.

5

Absent such

Renegotiability of a

punishment implies that a subgame perfect equilibrium path that requires the
punishment for attainment is not viable.
Only penalties that would survive renegotiation, given a deviation has
occurred, provide either party with bargaining power in negotiations over transfers.
The provider of a transfer has the power of a refusal to give now, and the recipient has
the ability to impose a credible punishment later. A credible punishment, in this paper,
is one which is subgame perfect and not subject to successful renegotiation.
Suppose, for example, that at some date the borrower is expected to pay a net
transfer of ten to the lender. (The nominal debt contract could specify a larger amount;
ten is what the lender anticipates in equilibrium.) Should she propose in pre-play
communication to renegotiate her transfer to five, the lender can respond that he will
punish her if she does.

But were she to insist on making the reduced out-of

equilibrium transfer, then the lender would be happy to take it. However, he could
retaliate for its inadequacy by in tum providing smaller transfers than he would have
along the equilibrium path, at future dates.
The threat of this penalty is effective for blocking the proposed renegotiation if
it ensures that her utility is lower despite her higher current consumption. The threat
is credible because at any time in the future at which the punishment dictates that the
lender reduce his net resource transfer, ("supply of new money"), the lender would at
that time find it in his interest to do so.

No alternate pair of strategies that the

borrower might propose at that time could make the lender better off. Similarly, the
borrower can threaten a credible retaliation for insufficient (that is, off-the-equilibrium
path) net transfer from the lender. If a loan that is smaller than the equilibrium one at
some date were made it would be taken, but future repayments would be reduced
enough so that the lender is worse off offering such a loan.
In this repeated game of borrowing and lending for consumption-smoothing,
renegotiation-proof equilibrium rules of the game or "strategy profiles" support paths
6

of transfers that deter credible punishments. In accordance with recent literature on
repeated games and renegotiation, our equilibria could be called bargaining equilibria.
We show that there are many renegotiation-proof bargaining equilibria for the
consumption-smoothing model. By the definition of Farrell and Maskin (1989), all of
our equilibria are also weakly renegotiation-proof, and strongly renegotiation-proof
equilibria exist.
Among the bargaining equilibria in our model, we focus on the subset that is
consistent with a competitive (free entry) lending market; that is, that the subsect
gives the lender zero profit in the initial period of the relationship. We characterize
the equilibrium path on the Pareto frontier of this subset, and the associated credible
punishment paths.
Equilibrium consumption and international transfers in the repeated game
evolve along a stochastic path that converges to a stochastic steady state.
Depending upon the common rate of discount, different types of equilibrium paths may
be observed. There may be no transfers in equilibrium, borrower consumption may be

fully smoothed from the initial date forward, or consumption may be at least partially
smoothed initially, and then either partially or fully smoothed in the steady state. If
consumption is partially smoothed, then it is serially correlated, even though the
borrower's endowment is independently distributed across periods.
This efficient equilibrium consumption-smoothing outcome can be achieved by
renegotiation of debt contracts incorporating legally enforceable strict seniority
privileges. The senior lender has the right to attach any payments by the borrower
either for debt service or to purchase financial assets in lender countries. 9 These debt
contracts can be at least as crude or simple as those that have been used for many
years in international lending. They can be simple public documents consisting of a
loan between named parties specifying single-valued repayment obligations
customarily denoted as interest and/or principal repayment.
7

When repayments

become due, all parties have the same information and are free to renegotiate any
terms of repayment, if they jointly wish to do so. The seniority privilege is an
extremely simple way for the punishments of the borrower by the lender to be
enforced; other potential providers of consumption smoothing only need to observe if a
lender has an outstanding debt claim to decide whether or not to deal with the
borrower. The seniority privilege effectively gives a lender the power to cut off all
lending to the borrower despite the competitive lending environment, and this power
establishes the lender's bargaining position in renegotiations with the borrower.
The equilibrium debt contract under renegotiation locks the borrower and her
initial creditor into a permanent relationship. A debt contract with formal repayment
obligations that cannot be fulfilled with positive probability in finite time along the
subsequent equilibrium path serves to establish this relationship in the presence of
seniority privileges and potential entry. Renegotiation of the formal terms of simple
debt contracts achieves a sequence of transfers dependent on the history of states of
nature. In the absence of commitment opportunities for either lenders or the borrower,
simple debt contracts with renegotiation suffice to sustain a path of net transfers that
is efficient in the set of attainable (that is, subgame perfect) equilibria, even though
the formal debt contracts are not state-contingent.IO

3. MODEL

AND NOTATION

The model economy has an infinite horizon in discrete time with periods
numbered t = 1, 2, . . . There is a single risk-averse agent (borrower) and J risk
neutral agents (lenders), with J ~ 1. Each agent receives an exogenous endowment
every period of a single non-storable good. The endowment of the risk-averse agent
is stochastic, and there is a finite number of states of nature, denoted by s

= 1, ... N.

The endowment of each risk-neutral agent is the same for every period for every
lender.

The endowment received by the borrower in any given period and the
8

preferences of every agent, as well as all past and current actions of every agent, are
common knowledge.
There are no external commitment opportunities available to any party. No
agent can commit to make a transfer of resources to any other agent. Therefore any
party can always simply choose not to make a transfer to another.
Each agent is infinitely-lived and maximizes a discounted stream of felicity of
current consumption using a constant rate of time preference. For simplicity, we
assume that the discount factor,

/3,

is common across all agents, and that the

endowment of the risk-averse agent is identically and independently distributed.
Assumption 1:

The utility function for the risk-averse agent is given by:

-

(1)

U 0 =EI/3tu(ct),
t=l

where felicity, u(c), is continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave, and
0 < /3 < 1. The expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of consumption
plans, (ci, c 2 ,

•••),

conditional on current information.

Period t endowments are

observed before period t consumption occurs. Subscript O denotes the borrower.
Assumption 2:
(2)

The utility function for each risk-neutral agent is given by:

-

uj = EI/3t ct'

for j = 1,... J,

t=l

where the expectation again is taken conditional on the current information set.
The states of nature are ordered with increasing borrower endowment, so that
y1 < y2 < ... < yN, and we assume that each risk-neutral agent receives an
endowment every period equal to yN.

We define the history of nature as

wt= (Yi, ... , Yt), where Yt is the realization of the state of nature at time t.

9

By assumption all transfers of part of one's endowment to another agent are
voluntary. There are no third parties to force such transfers nor can either agent force
the other to make a transfer. Hence all agents can simple choose to consume their
endowment streams. We define the surplus for an agent attained with a consumption
plan as the difference between the utility achieved under that plan and the utility
achieved under permanent autarky.

The payoffs to agents from an equilibrium

borrowing and repayment path are these surpluses. At time t, the borrower receives
surplus,

V0 (t) =[u(cn-u(y 1 )] + E

(3)

}:/Ji (u(c~+i)-u(y +J),
1

i=l

from the consumption plan, (c~, c~+P ...), and each risk-neutral agent receives
surplus,

..

Vj(t) =-rt+ EL,/3i -rt+i'
i=l

(4)

where

-r;, =(c~, -

yN) is the net transfer received by agent j in period t' .

Assumption 3:

After any history, each agent can always assure himself or

herself non-negative surplus.
This model can be represented by an infinitely repeated game, in which the
streams of transfers made by each agent to every other agent are strategies. We next
introduce the notation used in the rest of the paper, adopted from Rubinstein (1980)
and Abreu (1988).

The stage game
At each date, t, there is a simultaneous move stage game, {(AJ:=o' (ni):= 0 } ,
where Ai is the pure strategy set and ni the stage-game payoff function for agent i. A

strategy in the stage game is an action, ai e Ai . ai is the vector of transfers aij :2: 0
made by agent i to each other agent j where Ai is a simplex in R~ that depends upon
the endowment of agent i. That is,

Ai(y)={xeR~(2,xk <y, for y=yN for i=l, ... ,J ,andy=yt fori=O}
k,.i
An action profile, a, is the vector (a 0 , ••• , a1 ). The stage-game payoff for each agent

is a function, ni:A(yt) ➔ R+, where A(yt)=A0 (yt)xA 1(yN)x ... xA 1 (yN).

(A

varies only with Yt because yN is constant over time.) For the risk-averse agent,
J

.

J

)

n 0 (a) = u ( Yt - ~aoj + ~ajo - u(yt) and for risk-neutral agents,

There is a single Nash equilibrium for this stage-game, in which each agent
makes zero gross transfers to any other agent.

The Repeated Game
For the infinitely repeated game, we define a path (or punishment) to be the
sequence of action profiles taken over all possible histories of nature. A path is a
sequence, {a(wt)}:1 , where a(wt) specifies the transfers made by each agent at time
t for each feasible history of nature, wt.

The set of all paths is denoted by

n.

A

history of play is just the sequence of all past actions for all agents,
ht= (a (y 1), a(w 2 ), ••• a(wt)).

The set of all feasible histories of play up to and

including date t is denoted Ht .
A pure strategy profile,

CJ,

is a function from the set of histories to the space of

action profiles defined by cr(wt) = (cr0 (wt), ... , <J1 (wt)), where cr(w1 ) e A(y 1 ) and for
a 11

t:2:1,

and

i=O,...,J,
11

and

At-1 = A(y 1 ) x ... x A(yt_1 ) e R~(J+i)-(t-i). The set of all strategy profiles is denoted

I.

The strategy profile, a, specifies an initial path to be followed beginning in period 1
and paths, called punishments, to be initiated after some agent deviates from a
previously initiated path or punishment. We denote an initial path by s(a) and
punishments by q( a).
The payoff to agent i along the path s( a) at time t, is given by:

where 1ri(s(a),wt)= .nla(wt)) for s(a)={a(wt)}:1 and the continuation value,

v,(s( u), w') equals

ECtr-•"•(

s("),w,.)). and the expectation is taken with respect

to the distribution of {wt' r=t+l conditional on wt.
We will say that an initial path s( a) is supported by a set of punishments
{qi( Ci) J:=O if

for all i = 0, ... J and all feasible histories of nature, wt for t = 0, 1,... .

ni (s( a), wt)

is the maximal payoff in the stage game attainable by agent i for any feasible choice of
ai(wt) given that other agents all play the action aj(wt) prescribed by s(a). That is,
ni(s(a), wt)= ~ax{1ri(a 0 (w 1 ), ••• ,ai-1 ( wt),ai'ai+i (wt), .. ,aj(wt)) I ai e Ai},
1

where v,(q'(u), w,) equals

ECtr-•:ir,(

q'(u), w.,)

J

We denote the set of all strategy profiles that are subgame perfect equilibria by

IP.

We say that a e

IP

generated by members of

IP

generates the initial path s( a).
is

QP.

12

The set of all paths

4. RENEGOTIATION OF REPAYMENTS AND NEW LOANS
Equilibrium lending and repayment in the presence of potential renegotiation
are first analyzed for the case of an exclusive long-term relationship between the
borrower and a single lender. Each loan or repayment is voluntary in the absence of
third party enforcement of contracts. Since neither party can commit his or her future
actions, each chooses a strategy that maximizes his or her payoff in the repeated
game, taking the choice of strategy for the other as given after any history of previous
actions. Therefore, we first restrict strategy profiles to be subgame perfect.
In the single Nash equilibrium for the stage-game, an agent maximizes his or
her one-period payoff by making no positive transfer to the other agent. As is well
known, in the infinitely repeated game, outcomes other than infinite repetition of Nash
equilibrium play in the stage-game can be achieved by subgame perfect equilibria if
the discount rate is low enough. At least partial smoothing of the consumption path of
the risk-averse borrower is possible because a positive net transfer by one agent may
be rewarded by future cooperation in the consumption-smoothing relationship by the
other agent.
A player is deterred from failing to make a transfer that would be made on an
equilibrium path by threats that the other player will not behave cooperatively in the
future. Threatened punishments that support cooperation in equilibrium consist of
withholding from the deviant positive transfers that would otherwise have been made.
These threats are credible in the sense that they specify unilateral best responses for
each agent to the other agent's strategy in each subgame reached through a deviation
by one player.
Although neither player has an incentive to deviate singly from punishment
strategies in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the vector of payoffs achieved by a
punishment path may be Pareto-dominated by the payoffs provided by some other
subgame perfect equilibrium path. This is the case for a trigger strategy punishment:
13

permanent noncooperative play (autarky) serves as a subgame perfect equilibrium
punishment but is Pareto-dominated by some of the paths its threat supports for low
enough discount rates. A threat of such a punishment might be considered incredible if
players can communicate and agree to choose an alternative pair of strategies
following a one-period deviation by one of them.
In general, the payoffs sustained by a subgame perfect equilibrium after some

histories may be Pareto-dominated by the payoffs provided by another equilibrium. In
applications of repeated games it is often assumed that pre-play communication leads
the players to select an efficient path from the set of all paths generated by subgame
perfect equilibrium profiles. As pointed out by several authors 11 , the possibility of
negotiation, that is, communication, raises the possibility of renegotiation of the
punishments that support the equilibrium path.

The importance of potential

renegotiations between the players is that a subgame perfect punishment can deter
deviation from the equilibrium transfer path only if it cannot be abandoned by mutual
agreement. If a particular punishment is necessary to support an initial path and this
punishment is subject to successful renegotiation, then the initial path, as well as the
punishment path, cannot be considered viable. Because the agents are unable to
commit themselves not to renegotiate punishment strategies in our model, only initial
paths of transfers supported by punishment threats that cannot be renegotiated are
-

considered to be equilibrium paths. We choose to call such punishments credible.
Our approach to modelling lending to a sovereign under potential renegotiation
is to derive the equilibrium strategy profiles that survive the possibility of
renegotiation between the agents. An equilibrium path of loans and repayments is a
path of transfers that cannot be negotiated further.

Because out-of-equilibrium

behavior is also subject to renegotiation, equilibrium outcomes are subgame perfect
equilibria incorporating credible punishments. If one imagines a sequence of explicit
debt contracts each with negotiations over the amounts of actual repayments and new
14

loans, then the equilibrium outcome of these negotiations is the path generated by
some subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile incorporating credible punishment
threats. The transfers actually made by each agent along the equilibrium path are
those necessary to deter credible threats of noncooperation.
In our model, subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profiles incorporating
punishments that cannot be renegotiated are called "renegotiation-proof." Alternative
definitions of renegotiation-proof equilibria appear in the literature. The equilibria that
we derive for our model satisfy the different criteria of renegotiation-proofness
proposed by Farrell and Maskin (1989) and by Pearce (1987). The equilibrium profile
is strongly renegotiation-proof (Farrell and Maskin) and is a consistent bargaining
equilibrium (Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989)). In the next Section, we allow free
entry to lenders in the model and show that an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium
path emerges as a renegotiation-proof outcome.
We first characterize the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium paths and
payoffs for the two players in our consumption-smoothing model. Then we show the
existence of credible threats that support any equilibrium that is efficient in the set of
all subgame perfect equilibrium paths and characterize these punishments. As a first
step, the characterization of subgame perfect equilibria by Abreu (1988) is useful for
our description of equilibrium lending and repayment in the presence potential
renegotiation.
Following Abreu (1988), we present the following definitions and result.

1
0
DEFINITION: Let s, q , q be paths in

u[ s, q 0 , q 1],
(i)

QP.

The simple strategy profile, denoted as

specifies that

sis followed until an agent deviates singly from s,

15

(ii)

for each i = 0, 1, qi is followed if agent i deviates singly from s or from
No change in path

qj, j = 0, 1, whichever is the previously initiated path.
occurs if the two agents deviate simultaneously.

DEFINITION: For every strategy profile, <J, define

(i)

1
0
v(u,wt,ht)= v(r(<J),wt), for re{s,q ,q }, such that

<J

generates r in the

history ht,
(ii)

C( <J, wt)= { v( <J, wt, ht) I ht eHt} is the set of continuation values for

<J,

in the

history of nature wt , and
(iii)

~i (wt)= min { vi I ( v 0 , v 1 )e C( <J, wt), <JE ~?} and
~i(wt)={vl veC( u,wt)and vi =~i(wt),<TELP}, for eachi=O, 1.
Infinite repetition of the stage-game Nash equilibrium (permanent autarky) is

a subgame perfect equilibrium for this model.

Because a transfer cannot be

confiscated from either agent, permanent autarky provides the minimum payoff for an
agent in any subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile after he or she deviates from
an initial path. Therefore, ~i (wt) is zero for every wt and each i = 0, 1.
The following characterization of subgame perfect equilibria combines
propositions proved by Abreu (1988):

PROPOSITION (Abreu):

(i)

The simple strategy profile,

O

<J [ s, q ,

q 1], is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and

only if
Hi (s, wt)+ vi (qi, wt)~ Ki (s1wt) + vi (s, wt),
and
Hi (q j, wt) + vi (qi, wt) ~

K; ( q j,

wt)+ V; ( q j, wt),

for each i, j = 0, 1 and every feasible wt ,

16

(ii)

The paths, s, q 0 and q 1 , are in
continuation values
V

1

QP

if and only if they are each supportable by

v 0 (wt) and v 1 (wt),

where

v 0 (wt)e 12.0 (wt)

and

(w1 )e v1 (wJ

That is,
ii(r, wt)+ vi(w 1 ) S ni(r, wt)+ vi(r, wt),
for i =0, 1 and re{s, q O, q 1},
(iii)

A path s is an element of
profile such that

QP if

and only if a[s,q 0 ,q1] is a simple strategy

v(qi, w1 )e vi(w 1 ), fori = 0, 1 and every feasible w1 •

PROOF: Assumptions 1-4 of Abreu are satisfied by our game. (i) is Proposition 1 of
Abreu, (ii) is implied by Propositions 2-4, and (iii) is a restatement of Proposition 5 of
Abreu.
The proposition implies that a subset of all subgame perfect equilibrium profiles
suffices to generate all paths in

QP.

Any subgame perfect equilibrium path can be

generated by a simple strategy profile incorporating punishments that give agents who
deviate their worst possible subgame perfect outcomes. These punishments include
reversion to permanent autarky along with many paths that Pareto-dominate
permanent autarky. Therefore, most of the harshest punishments possible in perfect
equilibria do not survive renegotiation proposals between players.
We next characterize the set of all payoffs achievable in the repeated game
using subgame perfect equilibria. These are just the discounted streams of expected
surpluses for the two players from all paths that are supportable by reversion to Nash
equilibrium play (permanent autarky) for each given initial state of nature, Yi.

1
DEFINITION: Let W(y) ={ n(s(a),y)+ v(s(a),y)lae l?} for each ye {y , ••• yN}.

W(y) is the set of payoffs (ordered pairs) for all subgame perfect equilibria for the
two-player game starting in state of nature y.
We prove the following Proposition:
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PROPOSITION 1: For each ye {y1, .. ,yN}, W{y) is a convex and compact subset of

R!. The set QP is convex and compact.

I,P.

PROOF: We first show that QP is convex. Let CT1 and cr2 be two elements of

Because ,r1 is linear and

1f0

is convex in (a 0 .,... a 1 ), the net transfer made in the stage

game, we have for O <A< 1,

and
1f1 (ls{ cr1 )

+ {1- A)s(a 2 ), wt)+ V1 (ls{cr1 ) + {1-A )s{cr2 ), wt)

for all wt' each t.

The path, s =As{a 1 ) + {1-A)s{ a 2 ), is supportable by linear

combinations of the same punishments that support s(a1 ) and s(cr2 ) using the weights
A and {1-A), respectively. It follows that W{y) is convex.
W{y) is bounded because u(c) is continuous, 0 < /3 < 1, and the action set in
each stage-game is bounded. To show that W{y) is closed, take any payoff pair,
in W{y) and a sequence {vk}:=1 c W{y) that converges to

V.

We endow QP with

the product topology and select a sequence {s(crk)}:=1 c QP
v(s(ak),y) = Vk, where vi(s( ak),y) = ,ri(s(ak),y)+ vi(s( ak),y).

V,

such

that

Because A is a

compact subset of R! for each state, y, and ,r: n ➔ R 2 is continuous, V: n ➔ R 2 is
continuous. By Tychonoffs Theorem, the set
convergent subsequence.

n is compact; therefore, {s( (jkn:=l

has a

Without loss of generality, we can assume {s(crk)}:=1
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converges to a limit paths. Because V(s, y) is continuous, V(s, y) =V. It remains to
show that s e

QP.

Suppose not. This implies that

at least one i

= 0,1

(by Abreu's results). However,

njs, y) + 0 > 7ri (s, y) + vi (s, y), for

so that continuity of V(s, y) leads to a contradiction ands is a perfect equilibrium path.
Therefore,

W(y) is compact for all O< /3 < 1 and each ye {y1, ... , yN} and

QP

is

compact in the product topology.

DEFINITION: Let the frontier of

W(y) be the set

{v e W(y)IV =max ( 1r (s(a),y) + v (s(a),y)),
0

0

0

such that

V1 :s;1r1(s(a),y)+ v1(s(cr),y) and ere~?}.
The frontier of W(y) implicitly defines a function

V0 (V1; y), which gives the maximum

payoff in state y for the borrower in any subgame perfect equilibrium profile given that
the lender receives the payoff V1 and V0 (V1; y) is in

W(y).

PROPOSITION 2: The frontier of W(y) is downward-sloping and strictly concave.

PROOF: For Ve W(yt) such that V1 > 0, a reduction in V1 can be achieved in state Yt
by choosing a such that s(cr) is unchanged for all dates t' > t and a1 (wt) is increased.
This s(a) is an element of QP, and V0 = 1r0 (s(a), wt)+ v0 (s(cr), wt) is increased since
u(c) is increasing. Strict concavity follows from strict concavity of u(c) and convexity
ofQP.
Any pair of payoffs for the two agents sustainable by some subgame perfect
equilibrium is attainable using an initial path in which only one of the players at a time
makes a positive transfer to the other. This transfer is just the net transfer made in
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any equivalent initial path along which simultaneous transfers are made by the agents.
A unilateral transfer path is defined as a path such that at each date one of the agents
makes no transfer to the other. It is never rational for the recipient of a positive
transfer at some date to deviate from a unilateral transfer path. When an agent is a
recipient, his or her surplus in the stage-game is maximized by making no transfer and
accepting what is offered. Because the agent making a transfer currently consumes
less than his or her endowment, the repeated game payoff of the transferor can be zero
after some histories in a subgame perfect equilibrium. But he or she can receive at
most zero surplus in the stage-game by deviating from a unilateral transfer path.
Since the continuation value for either agent is always nonnegative, the current
transferee realizes positive surplus from the relationship.
W{y1 ) is the set of all payoffs that are sustainable by subgame perfect
equilibria at date t after any feasible history of actions, h1 e H 1 • Therefore, the surplus
available to the two agents to divide at any date depends only on the current
resources available because future endowments are independently distributed. In a
subgame perfect equilibrium, the transfers made at any date generally depend upon
the history of actions up to that date. Our notation suggests that the action profile
a(w 1 ) may also depend upon past states of nature rather than just on the current state
of nature. In the next Section, we show that the transfers planned for each state of
nature in the next period depend upon the current consumption of the borrower (hence,
on the history of nature) when consumption-smoothing is incomplete along the
equilibrium path.
We now show that any path in

QP

payoffs on the Pareto-frontier of W(y ).

is supported by punishments that sustain
If an agent deviates at date t, then the

punishment initiated at date t+ 1 is an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium path for
each

Yt+i

e {y1 , ••• , yN}. These threats are credible in the sense that both players
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cannot do better by abandoning the proposed punishment for an alternative subgame
perfect equilibrium path.

PROPOSITTON

(a)

3:

There exist paths q 0 andci:1eQP

0
such that n(q 0 ,wt)+v(q ,wt) and

n(q1 , wt)+ v(q1 , wt)

efficient

are

Pareto

in

the

set

W(yt)

1
ni(qi,wt)+v(qi,wt)=O, for i=O,l, for each yte{y , ••• ,yN}

wt=(wt-PYJ

It

follows

that

vi(qi,wt)=O,

and
where
since

vi (qi, wt)= E [ni (qi, wt)+ vi (qi, wt)]
(b)

1
0
For every seQP, the simple strategy profile cr[s, q , q ] is a subgame perfect

equilibrium.
PROOF:

(a)

By Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, W(yt) contains the closed intervals:
{( Yo, Vi) eR! IVo= 0 and O $

vl $ vl (yt)},

and

By Proposition 2,

where the maximum exists by Proposition 1.
1
0
Because QP is compact, there exist paths q , q e QP yielding payoffs at date t

Note that

V;

(qi, wt_1 ) = 0

and that

q0 and q1 need not be unique.
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(b)

For every seQP, ni (s, wi) + vi (s, wt)~ 0 for every feasible wt and for i = 0, 1.
Because ni(g\wt)+vi(g\wt)=0, the profile cr(s,q

0

,cr1)

is a subgame

perfect equilibrium.

Any pair of paths, q 0 and q 1 , given by Proposition 3 provides the lowest
continuation value to a deviant possible in any subgame perfect equilibrium, so that
q 0 and q 1 support any path sustained by the threat of permanent autarky. The paths
q 0 and q 1 are solutions to a dynamic programming problem that is deferred to the next
Section. The problem is to maximize the continuation value of the agent who does not
deviate over the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium paths subject to the constraint
that the deviant agent receives a continuation value of zero.
If agent i deviates from an initial path seQP at date t, the path qi prescribes a

sequence of transfers between the agents for all dates t' > t . Because the set of
payoffs, W(Yt+i), depends only on yt+1 , the path qi followed from date t+l onwards is
independent of the hismry of nature before t+ 1, wt. Therefore, we use the notation
q 1 (t + 1), to identify the punishment initiated at date t+ 1 in response to a single player
deviation at date t. The paths, q 0 ( t + 1) and ci:1 (t + 1) are not necessarily unique, but
the paths of net transfers made in either punishment are shown to be unique in Section
7 below.
1
0
Because the simple strategy profile, cr[s, q , q ], is a subgame perfect

equilibrium, the following inequality must hold for i = 0, 1:

Since
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and

the maximum stage-game payoff that agent i can realize by deviating from the
punishment <t(t), ni(ct(t), wt), must be equal to zero. This implies that an agent
who deviates from any initial path receives no transfer in any state of nature during
the first period after playing noncooperatively.
The punishments q 0 (t+l) and q 1(t+l) have the property that the deviant
plays cooperatively beginning in period t+ 1 (after he or she deviates in period t) by
making a non-negative transfer to the other player. The other player pays nothing,
and receives all of the surplus from initiating an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium
at date t+ 1 in each possible state of nature, Yt+i. If the deviant deviates again (fails
to cooperate in period t+1) then qi (t + 2) is initiated. That is, the same qi restarts in
period t+2. The player who was co, perating in period t continues to make no transfers
to the currently deviant player. To comply with the punishment, the deviant must
make the initial equilibrium transfer that starts him or her on an efficient equilibrium
path giving all of the surplus possible in a subgame perfect equilibrium to the initially
cooperative player. Subsequently, the player who did not deviate resumes positive
transfers consistent with the new punishment path given the evolution of states.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that all paths are unilateral transfer
paths since any payoff vector in W(y 1 ) is attainable this way and all paths are
supportable by q 0 and q 1 • We label the punishments using unilateral transfers that
yield the deviant zero surplus and are on the frontier of W(yt), q0 (t) and

q1 (t).

Farrell and Maskin (1989) define a subgame perfect equilibrium , a, to be
weakly renegotiation-proof if no member of the set of paths generated by a in feasible
histories of actions strictly Pareto-dominates another member of the set. A weakly
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renegotiation-proof equilibrium is renegotiation-proof in the sense that if the players
agree on a strategy profile

a at the outset and the history of play at date t means that

a path q should be followed, they do not have a joint incentive to switch to another
path generated by

a. In particular, they both cannot gain by abandoning a punishment

for the initial path.12
A weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium survives the possibility of such
"internal" renegotiations (in the terminology of Pearce), but there may exist a path
generated by another subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile that is preferred by
both agents in some history. Farrell and Maskin define a strongly renegotiation-proof
equilibrium to be a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium such that none of the paths
it generates in any feasible history of play is strictly Pareto-dominated by another
weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium.13
The properties of the sets of subgame perfect equilibrium paths and payoffs
proved in Propositions 1 and 2 can be used to find punishments in QP which support
any path in QP in a simple strategy profile that is weakly renegotiation-proof. Rather
than prove this result, we allow the two agents to negotiate over the strategy profile
that is adopted and show that a strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists for all
discount rates. In our model, the agents cannot commit themselves not to renegotiate
the strategy profile they are following, mutually agreeing on another that incorporates
credible threats of punishment for deviation. Also, by emphasizing initial paths that
are efficient in the set of paths supported by credible threats, we anticipate assuming
free entry by lenders in initial contracts in Section 7 below.
We call an equilibrium renegotiation-proof if it is renegotiation-proof by the
Farrell and Maskin definition, replacing the weak Pareto rule with the strong rule by
which one allocation dominates another only if it makes each party at least as well off
and one party strictly better off.

In our model the weak rule is unnecessary for

existence of equilibrium.
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PROPOSITION 4: There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium

u such that for every

feasible wt and ht eHt' the payoff vector 1r(r( a), wt)+ v(r( u), wt) is Pareto efficient
in W(yt), where r(u) is the path generated by

u in history ht. The strategy profile

u [s, q0 ,q1 ], where s is an efficient unilateral transfer path in QP, is strongly
renegotiation-proof.
PROOF: Because QP is compact in the product topology, there exists an reQP such
that the payoff vector, 1r(r, wt)+ v(r, wt), is Pareto efficient in the set W(yt), for
every Yt e{y1 , ••• ,yN}, for all t ~ 1. In particular, there is an initial path seQP that
yields

any

Pareto

efficient

payoff

vector

in

W(y1 ).

Since

v(s, wt_1 ) =/JE{1r(s, wt)+ v(s, wt)) and Bellman's Principle holds, the payoff vector,
1r(s, wi)+ v(s,wt) is Pareto efficient in W(yt) for every yte{y1, ... ,yN}, for each
feasible wt_1 , t > 1. (The expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of Yt .)
Likewise, the payoff vectors sustained by

q0 ( t') and q1 ( t') are Pareto efficient in

W(yt) for all t ~ t' ~ 1.
Because the strategy profile,

u [s, q0 , q1], is in I,P for all seQP, it is a subgame

perfect equilibrium for every s e QP that yields a payoff vector on the Pareto frontier of
W(y1 ). After every feasible history of play and of nature, u sustains a payoff vector
on the Pareto frontier of W(y 1). Therefore, u[s, q°, q1] is strongly renegotiation-proof
for any efficient seQP.

Proposition 4 demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium that survives the
possibility of renegotiation by mutual agreement.

Furthermore, it shows that an

equilibrium path of transfers that is efficient among those that are supported by trigger
strategy punishment threats is also sustainable in a renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
The equilibrium profile generates a path in every history of nature and of play that is
Pareto-undominated by an other subgame perfect equilibrium path.
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In our strongly renegotiation-proof equilibria, if agent i deviates by making a
smaller transfer than required in the equilibrium path at some date (for any feasible
history), then the other agent j refuses to provide a positive transfer to agent i until
after agent i cooperates in his or her punishment. Agent j can only lower his or her
utility by agreeing to abandon the punishment

qi

on the next date, and agent i cannot

increase his or her payoff by again unilaterally deviating, this time from the path

qi.

For any deviation by agent i from an efficient perfect equilibrium path, agent j can do no
better than to carry out his or her part of the punishment
attempt by agent i to renegotiate

cf

fails.

q;.

This means that any

A refusal to accept an attempted

renegotiation of the punishment is credible because the other agent maximizes his or
her payoff by reinitiating

qi

in the period after agent i make s smaller payment than

prescribed by the punishment.
Pearce (1987) suggests an alternative definition of renegotiation-proofness
which allows strategy profiles with Pareto-ranked continuation equilibria.

In

symmetric games, his definition requires that the path generated by the strategy
profile after every history not be strictly Pareto dominated by the worst possible
outcome under another strategy profile. In general, a strategy profile a is called
renegotiation-proof by his definition if there exists no other strategy profile

er in I,P

which generates paths in all histories at least as good in a Pareto sense as some path
generated by a and such that some worst equilibrium outcome for
dominates an equilibrium outcome for

<J.

er

strictly Pareto

Pearce emphasizes renegotiation between

strategy profiles ("external renegotiation") to the exclusion of renegotiation within an
equilibrium ("internal renegotiation"). Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) define a
strategy profile to be a consistent bargaining equilibrium if it is renegotiation-proof in
the sense of Pearce (1987).
For our model, the strategy profile a [s, q0 , q1] for any efficient subgame perfect
equilibrium path, s, is a consistent bargaining equilibrium. 14 Although this concept of
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renegotiation differs significantly from the approach taken by Farrell and Maskin, the
choice of definition of renegotiation-proofness is not instrumental for our consumption
smoothing game. With the zero-sum stage-game, each definition yields the same set
of efficient renegotiation-proof equilibria. The simple strategy profile

CT[s, q0 , q1] is

renegotiation proof (either definition) and sufficient 15 to support the efficient paths in
QP.

Because the initial paths generated by our renegotiation-proof equilibria are
efficient among the set of subgame perfect equilibrium paths, we state two results for
limits in the discount factor. The first follows from the Folk Theorem for repeated
games with discounting proved by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986): There exists a
value for the discount factor, 0 < /3 < 1, such that for all

/3'?:. /3,

every renegotiation

proof equilibrium path fully smooths the borrower's consumption. The second is that
there exists another value for the discount factor, 0 < /3 < 1, such that for all

/3 s;; /3 , the

only subgame perfect equilibrium is permanent autarky. This result is straightforward.
5. THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS
In this Section, we discuss the dynamics of lending and repayment in a strongly
renegotiation-proof equilibrium path for the long-term debtor-creditor relationship. In
anticipation of introducing free entry with many potential lenders, we characterize the
initial path in which all of the surplus in the relationship in the first period goes to the
borrower. This is the path chosen by the borrower when an exclusive relationship is
formed at the outset in the presence of free entry. The punishment paths are found by
solving a similar problem, giving all the surplus at the initiation of the punishment to
the non-deviating party.
The equilibrium strategy profile,

CT [ s,

q0 , q1] , such that all the initial surplus in

the exclusive relationship goes to the borrower and sis efficient in QP is denoted

CT*.

The problem of finding the path s( CT*) is to derive the solution to the dynamic program:
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for each i and for all wt and t,
with respect to unilateral transfer paths, s e

QP •

This problem is identical to determining the path for a subgame perfect
equilibrium whose outcome is Pareto-undominated by that for any other subgame
perfect equilibrium for this model. Our first result is:

PROPOSITION 5: Along the initial paths( er*), the borrower's consumption plan and the
net transfers made between the agents are unique for each wt .
PROOF: Because u(c) is strictly concave, so is n-0 (s, Yi)+ v0 (s, Yi), and

QP

is convex.

Therefore, n-0 (s, wt) is unique for every wt for every solution path s, so that the path of
net transfers supported by s( er*) is unique.

Because the frontier of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes is
concave and differentiable, we can state the dynamic program for finding s( a*) as a
straightforward concave programming problem.

In their paper on implicit wage

contracts, Thomas and Worrall (1988) analyze the dynamics of wages for an efficient
contract in a consumption-smoothing problem similar to ours. They assume that
exclusive relationships must be formed at the initial date and that any departure from
the implicit contract leads to permanent reversion to the Nash equilibrium in the single
period game. We use their results to describe the dynamics of borrower consumption
and net transfers along the path s( er*) for each wt.
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Because s(er*) gives a unique action profile and unique ordered pair of
continuation values for each history wt, we can state the problem of determining s(er*)
in the following form. Let V1 (wt, y') denote the surplus the lender receives along the
initial paths when state y' occurs at time (t + 1) after the history of nature wt. Let

v0 (V1 ; y')

be the efficient frontier of all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in state

y'. V0 (v1 ; y') denotes the surplus the borrower receives if V1 is the payoff of the
lender in state y'. The path s(er*) is found by solving for each state k

= 1, ... N, :

subject to V0 (v1 (wt, y'); y') ~ 0, for ally',

The expectation is taken over the distribution of y', for l

=1, ... , N.

The surplus of

the borrower in the relationship is maximized with respect to her current consumption
and the payoffs for the next period promised the lender in equilibrium.
Because this is a concave programming problem, the necessary conditions for
an optimum are also sufficient. To finds( er*), we set V1 (y1 ) equal to zero, as implied
by initial free entry of lenders. The first-order conditions for maximization of the
implied Lagrangian and the envelope condition yield:
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for each l = 1, ... , N, where c (wt, y') is consumption at time t+ 1 in state l, /3 p, q,, is
the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
probability that state l occurs), and
constraint V1 (wt' y') ~ 0.

v (v (wt'y');y')~o
0

/3p, 'f/11.

1

(where p, is the

is the Lagrange multiplier for the

The punishment path

<i1 (t) is found in the same way,

reinterpreting t as the first period after the most recent lender deviation.
punishment path for a borrower deviation in period t - 1,

The

q0 (t), is found similarly, but

maximizing lender profits with the borrower's surplus constrained to be non-negative.
The dynamics of s( CT*) are summarized in the following result adapted from
several propositions in Thomas and Worrall (1988). For completeness, we offer a
proof in the appendix that is much simpler in parts that the proofs in Thomas and
Worrall. Our version extends readily to a model in which the borrower's endowment
follows a Markov chain displaying first-order stochastic dominance.

= (wt-i, Yt ), borrower consumption in
internal, [£k, ck], where Yt = y\ and is

PROPOSITION 6: For any history of nature, wt

the path s( Cf•; wt) is restricted to a closed
given by

Furthermore, ck > c' and £k > £' for yk > y' and yk e [£k, ck]

YN = CN, y• =£·.
PROOF:

See appendix.
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for

each

yk,

and

In an exclusive relationship that yields a Pareto-undominated payoff within the
set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes for each state of nature, the consumption
of the borrower and net transfer made by one party at each date each follow Markov
chains. For large enough

/3, (/3 ~ /3},

full consumption smoothing results, so that the

transfer made each period in s( er*) is identically and independently distributed. In this
case, all of the intervals
than

fJ,

[!l, ck] overlap for k =1, ... N.

If, on the other hand,

/3

is less

then for each k the interval is a single point, yk and there is no smoothing.

The upper end of any given interval, ck , is the consumption that the borrower realizes
in state yk in an efficient path if all the surplus in the relationship from that date
forward goes to the borrower, and similarly, for the lender when borrower's
consumption is fk .
For

/3

between

/3

and {3, the borrower's consumption follows a non-trivial

Markov chain even though her endowment is identically and independently distributed
across dates. This is intuitive because possible consumption levels next period are
being planned in the current period, and the efficient path smooths these as much as
possible subject to the absence of commitment and the limits on punishments. (No
agent can be forced to provide any given transfer.) If a transfer in some state for the
next period that provides the risk-averse borrower with identical consumption to that
in the current period leaves both agents with non-negative surplus, then any
divergence in the consumption levels, holding constant consumption in all other states
next period, would reduce utility for at least one of the agents. History matters
because planned consumption is smoothed between today and tomorrow to the
greatest extent possible so that next period's transfers depend upon today's
consumption and tomorrow's realized state of nature.

The Markov dependence

follows from forward-looking behavior, in contrast to the role of the history of actions.
Figure 1 portrays the intervals for possible values of the borrower's
consumption in an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium path for an example such that
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[3 < f3 < f3

and y can take on four possible values. The borrower's endowment is

recorded on the horizontal axis and her consumption on the vertical. The vertical bars
denote the intervals,

[£k, ck].

The reader is invited to track a history for s(er•) in Figure 1. Let the first
period (period 1) endowment of the borrower be y3 • Her consumption at date 1 is
4
given by c3 • Now, if her period 2 endowment is y3 or y , then her consumption is the

same as in period 1. If her endowment instead falls to y2 or y1 , then her consumption

c2 or c1 • Now suppose that her endowment takes the following history
for six periods, w6 =(y3, y4 , y2 , y3 , y1 , y4 ). The borrower' consumption follows the
plan, (c3 c3 , c2 c2 , c1 £4 ). This is the path ABCDEF indicated by the dashed line in

falls to either

Figure 1. After y1 has occurred for the first time, the transfers follow the stochastic
4
1
steady state. If, for example, the endowment history (y 3 , y4 , y2 , y3 , y , y ) immediately

recurs starting in period 7, income-consumption combinations from periods 7 through
12 are the points GFHGEF, consumption being constant at £4 in the periods 7 through
10, then falling to

c1 in period

11, returning to £4 again in period 12. There are only

two consumption levels in the steady state in this example,
less than the higher consumption levels

c2 , c3

or

c4

c1 and £4 • Because

£4 is

that might be observed in the

transition, the latter never recur in the steady state. Consumption below

c1

never

occurs on the equilibrium path s( er•), either in the transition or in the steady state.
In such cases of partial smoothing in the steady state, the net transfer to the
borrower is larger at a given y1 if the endowment is falling (y1 < y1_ 1 ) than if it is
increasing, even though y is i.i.d. Her consumption is Markovian, as noted above, not
i.i.d. as asserted by Grossman and von Huyck (1988). A testable implication of this
model is that net transfers are positively related to their first lag, and negatively
related to the first difference of the level of the endowment.

If /3 ~ /3

, the steady state is fully

smoothed at

c1, as depicted in Figure 2. But

the steady state is not reached until the first period in which y 1 occurs. If the initial
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sequence of endowment realizations starting with period 1 is, for example,
(y4,y3,y4,y 2 ,y1 ), then consumption follows the path JKLMN in Figure 2, consumption
permanently remaining at

c1 after period 5.

The equilibrium path is enforced by the punishment paths in the simple
strategy profile cr•[s,q0 , q 1 ]. A punishment qi (t+l) starts in period t + 1 whenever
the borrower or lender singly deviates from the path (whether the equilibrium path
s( u*) or a punishment path) in force in period t. In a simple strategy profile a
punishment is independent of the size of deviation taken, so a deviant would rationally
choose to make a zero transfer.16
The punishment of one agent gives the other all of the maximum surplus
available from the relationship, from t + 1 onwards. The only social loss caused by a
one-period deviation by the borrower is the reduction in feasible smoothing between
periods t and t + 1. In period t + 1, cooperation by the borrower in her punishment is
Pareto-undominated in the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. If the
0
borrower dues not cooperate in the punishment, (i.e. if she deviates from q ( t + 1)),

the punishment merely re-starts as q 0 (t + 2). She can get at most zero surplus after
she deviates from any strategy she may choose.
cooperation in the punishment

Her continuation value from

q0 (t + 1) is the same as under permanent autarky.

To see how the punishments work, consider, for example, a deviation by the
borrower from the equilibrium path s( u•) in period 2 in the example illustrated in
4
2
Figure 1, when the borrower's endowments are, as before, (y4, y , y3, y1, y ) for

periods 2 through 6. Instead of paying y4 surplus measured by

c3 -

c3

in period 2 and receiving positive

£4 , as at point B in Figure 1, the borrower deviates, paying

nothing and consuming y4 at point Q. But she loses surplus measured by

c3 -

£4 from

the deviation.
When the borrower cooperates in her punishment

q0 (3), her consumption path

after period 2 follows a new efficient path RSTF illustrated by the dashed lines in
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Figure 3, and subsequently enters a stochastic steady state path of consumption
identical to that observed on the initial equilibrium path s( u•). But until period 5,
consumption is lower than it would have been under s( u•). The net social loss from
the deviation is the loss, as of period 2, of the feasible smoothing between
consumption in period 2 and the vector of possible consumption levels in period 3. A
2
comparison of Figures 1 and 3 shows that, given the realization y occurred in period

3, consumption was increased when it was higher (in period 2) and decreased when it
was lower (in period 3) by the deviation in period 2. What happens if the borrower
does not cooperate in

q0 (3) in period 3? In period 4, the endowment draw is y3 •

borrower cooperates in the new punishment
point S the path

qO ( 4), she pays y3 -

q0 (3) discussed immediately above.

If the

£3 and rejoins at

If the borrower continues to

q0 (5) in period 5. Instead of making the

deviate, then the punishment restarts as

(below steady state) transfer in period 5, prescribed by

q (3) that would raise the

borrower's consumption to point T, the lender continues his moratorium on transfers,
so the borrower consumes only £ 1 • If the borrower then cooperates in period 6 by
4
making a transfer of y4 - £ , the punishment path subsequently follows the same

path as s( u*).
4
In the steady state at maximum income y the borrower is left with zero

surplus under s( u•) or any punishment of her,

q0 (·), in contrast to the dynamic

situation in period 2, discussed above, where compliance leaves her positive surplus.
4
4
But she still gains nothing from deviation from the equilibrium transfer (y - £ ).

The punishment path does not necessarily eventually converge to the path
s( O"•), as in the above example. The plan followed under

qO ( t + 1) if the borrower

deviates in the steady state in period t for the case shown in Figure 2, with
endowment realizations (Yt• Yt+l' Yt+ 2 ,yt+3 )

=(y4, y3,y4, y1 ),

follows the dashed path

4
shown in Figure 4. By deviating, the borrower consumes y in period t instead of

c1,

4
3
but then suffers a fall in consumption to £ , with consumption constant at £
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thereafter, permanently below the steady state level

c1 on the equilibrium path s( er*).

Since in y4 compliance with consumption smooth at
measured by

c1 -

£4

,

c1

yields positive surplus

the borrower in this case is strictly worse off in period t by

deviating and obtaining zero surplus.
For deviation in period t by the lender, th~ punishment ,:j_1 ( t + 1) means that all
surplus goes to the borrower in t+ 1, just as in the initial period of the relationship in
the same state as wt+l' under free entry. Thus the punishment is just the re-initiation
of the equilibrium path. In Figure 2 with yt = y 2 , consider lender deviation in the
steady state from his equilibrium transfer

c1 -

y2 stipulated by s( er*). If the next four

endowment realizations are (y3, y4, y2, y1 ) then the punishment path

q1 (t + 1) passes

through points KLMN, following the same sequence of transfers as in the initial path
s( er*) illustrated in Figure 2 for periods 2 through 5, discussed above, thereafter
keeping borrower consumption constant at

c1 •

The lender loses, (ex ante),

c2 - c1

from the deviation in this example. Had the lender's deviation from s( er*) occurred in
state y1 , the entire burden of the social loss would have fallen on the borrower, but
the lender would still have gained nothing from the deviation.
If a punishment of the borrower

q0 O were in force in the steady state in this

case (see Figure 4) with current state Yt
new lender punishment path

=y1 ,

lender deviation from

q0 O leads to a

q1 (t + 1) which, when followed causes a loss in lender

surplus as of period of t of c1 - £4 • Borrower consumption rises in t + 1 to at least

c1 ,

. the steady state level under s( er*), and converges to that level from above in the
steady state.
The above punishments are extremely simple.

There is a moratorium on

transfers to the deviant until the deviant complies with the punishment path starting
or re-starting in the current period. This path transfers all the surplus anticipated in
the relationship to the aggrieved party. Along the punishment path, the borrower's
consumption is smoothed relative to last period's consumption to the maximum extent
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feasible, in general delaying convergence to the stochastic steady state to the
advantage of the aggrieved party. This is shown in Figure 2 for a case of deviation by
the lender, and in Figure 3 for deviation by the borrower. After the moratorium is
lifted, the deviant in most cases continues to receive reduced net transfers for some
periods.
The meaning of renegotiation-proofness of the simple strategy profile

a• [ s,

q0 , q1], and the contrast with trigger strategies, are illuminated by Figure 5.

Proposition 6 implies that the maximum payoff that the lender can get in any perfect
equilibrium is increasing in the current state Yt> and the maximum payoff that the
borrower can attain over all perfect equilibria is decreasing in yt . Figure 5 shows the
frontiers of surpluses from the repeated game for the two extreme endowment states
y1 and yN and for a /3 such that a cooperative game exists

(/3 ~ f3).

The intersection

of the frontier, V0 (v1, y1 ) with the horizontal axis at point C shows the surplus from
the repeated game on the equilibrium path s( a•) in period t if Yt

=y

1

•

In that state

the lender is making the unilateral transfer to tl.e borrower, who receives all the
surplus.
If, on the other hand, the borrower deviated the previous period then the

punishment

q0 (t) yields surpluses represented by point A. The borrower gets no

surplus. The lender, who withholds the transfer he would have made had the borrower
not deviated, gets zero payoff in the stage game but all the surplus, OA units of
expected present value of profit, from the future transfers along the punishment path.
Similarly point B shows the surpluses that accrue in the steady state on the
equilibrium paths( a•) in period t if Yt

= yN.

The borrower, who makes the transfer in

this case, gets no surplus; she transfers it all to the lender. If in any state wt the
lender alone has deviated at the most recent date k at which he would in equilibrium
have made a transfer, then the surpluses are the ordered pair at point D. The lender
gains nothing, and the borrower gets no payoff in the stage game but positive surplus
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1
from future transfers along the punishment path q_ (k + 1). The horizontal distance DC

measures the social loss in terms of the loss in borrower utility from deviation by the
lender when the current state is y1 • (Remember y is i.i.d. and OD is the surplus V0
when the stage-game payoffs are zero and a punishment of the lender is in effect next
period.) The vertical distance BA shows the loss in expected profit to the lender from
borrower deviation when the current state is yN . The social cost of non-cooperative
· behaviour by either party is ·positive, in general, because a feasible opportunity for
smoothing the risk-averse borrower's consumption between the current period and the
next is foregone.
Permanent reversion to autarky as in trigger strategy punishments would leave
the surpluses at point 0.

The distances AO and OD represent the gains from

"renegotiations" of trigger strategy punishments by the borrower and lender
respectively for deviation in current state Yt. Since A and D both Pareto dominate 0,
the trigger strategies are not renegotiation-proof under alternative current
conceptions, including those of Farrell and Maskin (1989) and oi Pearce (1987).

6. IMPLEMENTATION VIA SIMPLE DEBT CONTRACTS WITH SENIORITY:
THE ROLE OF THE DEBT BURDEN

The renegotiation-proof consumption smoothing transfers described above can
be implemented via simple debt contracts, between the borrower and a competitive
lender in a lending market with free entry, subject to the seniority privilege. The
seniority privilege means that if any contractually specified loan repayment obligation
has not been fulfilled, the lender has an enforceable right to any international financial
transfers (repayments, investments, or loans) made by the debtor.

Seniority is

common knowledge.
The loan contract specifies the identities of the parties, and the sequence of
formal repayment obligations (principal plus interest). The net transfers actually
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made ("loan repayments" less "new loans") are renegotiated between borrower and
senior lender, so that net transfers in equilibrium are determined by s( er*) regardless
of the details of the formal contract. Renegotiation here has an especially simple form.
No explicit sequence of offers and counteroffers, familiar in simultaneous bargaining
games, is necessary.

The essential act of renegotiation is merely the unilateral

transfer (loan or repayment) made by one party and received by the other. If the
transfer deviates from the equilibrium transfer, a punishment phase is then initiated by
the recipient. But it is in the interests of the recipient to accept any positive transfer
that the deviant offers; renegotiation does not entail any refusal of an offered transfer.
The equilibrium renegotiation is enforced by the credible threats embodied in the
punishments

q0 and q1 •

The punishment

q1 , which motivates the lender to make a positive net transfer

in equilibrium when the borrower's endowment realization is low, is simply imposition
of a debtor repayment moratorium whenever new loans are less than the equilibrium
level. The moratorium lasts until a new positive-valued loan is made, consistent with
the efficient path, that yields all surplus to the debtor in the current state
yi, i =1, 2, ... ,N. This loan is the same as the initial loan in the same state yi under
free entry into a new lending relationship.
Similarly, the punishment

q0 , initiated when the endowment realization is high

and net repayments fall short of the equilibrium level, is a moratorium on new loans.
This moratorium persists regardless of shocks to the borrower's endowment, until
such time as a new positive repayment is made to the lender with a magnitude
consistent with the efficient path that yields all surplus to the lender in the state
prevailing at the time of the repayment.
If the lender's punishment of a deviant borrower under

q0 is to support the

efficient smoothing relationship with a competitive lending market, the borrower must
be unable to obtain any funds from any other competitive lenders during the
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punishment. This means that the formal full repayment obligation contractually
specified for any period (the payment that must be made for the lender's seniority right
to lapse) must be at least as large as the maximum present value of repayments that
0
could be required up to that period under the punishment q •

Otherwise, a new

competitive lender could in some state buy out the old lender's seniority by paying off
the contractually specified obligation, loan a little more, and still make non-negative
profits. Anticipation of this would render the punishment incredible.
Free entry into initial loan contracts ensures that the equilibrium strategy
profile

u*[s,q ,cf]
0

is unique for each wt.

Assuming in addition strict seniority

privileges, the equilibrium loan contract effectively gives permanent seniority to an
exclusive lender (or, equivalently, a group of lenders). Consider the situation depicted
in Figure 1. If a loan contract is initiated in period 1 in the second highest state, with
endowment y3 , the value of the competitive initial loan is the expected present value
of the repayments, y4

-

c3 ,

which occur in those immediately subsequent periods, in

any, in which y4 occurs before the next realization of a lower value of y. On the
equilibrium path, the borrower's consumption in those periods equals her consumption
in the first year of the loan; consumption is completely smooth over those periods.
Suppose instead that the loan is formally paid off if there is a finite number n of
4
successive occurrences of y and equal repayments of the loan after the first period.

Then the initial loan, and initial consumption would have to be a little lower than if n
4
were infinite. Furthermore if y should recur in period n+2, consumption would rise to

y4 • (No new smoothing loans would be taken until y falls below its maximum value.)
If n is infinity, transfers with the same zero expected present value completely smooth
3
the consumption that occurs until y first falls below y , and at a higher level. So an

infinite n is strictly preferred by the risk-averse borrower.

Thus the option of

eventually paying off the loan is, in equilibrium, sold off by the borrower at the initial
· period of borrowing in exchange for a larger loan .
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More generally, the borrower chooses a contract such that her consumption is
smoothed as much as it can be across dates and histories of nature subject to the
constraints imposed by subgame perfection. In particular, she chooses a contract such
that her first period consumption cannot be further increased without lowering
consumption in some future history in which it is already equal to or lower than her
first period consumption along the equilibrium path. In some future histories, her
consumption along an equilibrium path can be higher than her first period consumption,
but in these histories the individual rationality constraint will be binding (that is, her
surplus over permanent autarky consumption will equal zero). If there is a positive
probability that her debt will go to zero in finite time, then the borrower is anticipating
that in some future histories her consumption will be higher than it is today and she
will be getting positive surplus. She can reduce her consumption in these histories
further and raise her (lower) present consumption by eliminating the possibility of
paying off the debt.
In a loan contract, permanent seniority is achieved by ensuring that the
repayment obligation (principal plus interest) exceeds, for any possible sequence of
states, the value of the maximum net repayments possible along the equilibrium path.
This means the interest contractually specified for the loan must exceed the maximum
equilibrium next-period repayment. In the transition to the stochastic steady state,
the maximum net repayments possible rise monotonically, in general, along the
equilibrium path so that the debt burden must rise to maintain a permanent
relationship. However, if any state of nature recurs an increase in the debt burden is
unnecessary and once the stationary state is reached further increases are also
unnecessary. The minimum interest rate payment (principal plus interest) that needs
to be charged, applied to the entire accumulated balance, declines in equilibrium each
period during the transition. This appears consistent with the tendency for spreads in
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interest rates for a new borrower to decline over time, as found empirically by Ozler
(1988a).
7. CONCLUSION

We have modelled international lending to a sovereign as a repeated game
played between a risk-neutral lender and a risk-averse borrower. In this model, one
agent makes a unilateral transfer of a single good to the other at any date in
anticipation of future reciprocal cooperation in the consumption-sm oothing
relationship. In contrast with the model of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) in which trade
sanctions are exchanged for contemporaneous repayments each period, renegotiation
of a formal simple debt contract is not appropriately modelled as a strategic Nash ·
bargaining game. Actions by the two players are sequential, not simultaneous, so
that repayments by the borrower and new loans by the lender are made to deter
threatened punishment consisting of future noncooperative play by the other agent.
Strategies, including punishments, are not only subject to unilateral deviation by either
agent, but must also survive the possibility of joint agreements to abandon them in
favor of alternative strategies in any history.
We have shown that any efficient subgame perfect equilibrium path for the
two-person repeated game can be supported by an equilibrium strategy profile that is
renegotiation-proof under alternative (and very different) current definitions in the
game theory literature. In our model, the lender and the borrower are treated in an
essentially symmetric fashion: neither agent can commit his or her future actions. The
borrower makes transfers to the lender to assure future consumption-smoothing
inflows adequate to leave her at least as well off in every history as she would be in
permanent autarky. Likewise, the lender makes a positive transfer only if, looking
forward from that date on, he obtains non-negative expected profit by doing so; the
lender cannot commit to make an insurance contract. This contrasts with models in
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which one-sided commitment by the lender is possible. Asymmetries arise in our
model in the difference in attitudes towards risk (that generate gains from trade) and
by assuming free entry in the initial contracts (which gives all of the initial surplus to
the borrower).
With free entry by lenders in the presence of a seniority privilege, the initial
equilibrium contract creates an exclusive long-term relationship between the borrower
and a lender. Standard simple debt contracts can be used to establish a permanent
relationship, with renegotiation of the formal crude terms of the contract assuring that
an efficient path of transfers is followed, subject to the perfection constraints. In this
repeated setting, with a sufficiently low discount rate, the debtor-creditor relationship
is not the simple one that a standard debt contract specifies.

However, state

contingent contracts are unnecessary to achieve at least partial smoothing in the
presence of potential renegotiation of a long-term relationship.
The formal contract serves only to create the permanent relationship; a simple
debt contract used in equilibrium will be one such that the debt burden at all dates,
including the first, is large enough that it can never be paid off in any possible history
of nature following the equilibrium path. We believe that this sheds some light on the
nature of debt relationships in general. A crude contract (incorporating no state
contingent clauses) is sufficient to sustain an efficient intertemporal allocation for
parties with different attitudes towards risk under uncertainty. This is true even
though there is no asymmetry of information (induced, for example, by costly
verifiability of the borrower's endowment) as in one-period credit market models in
the literature.
Our assumption of a strict seniority privilege might seem to imply that an
external authority, such as a creditor country government, is necessary for our results.
In an extension of this study, we show that the efficient equilibrium path can be
supported by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy profile under free entry by
42

lenders in the absence of any external enforcement. Seniority is assumed in this paper
so that we may concentrate on renegotiation and the dynamics of the consumption
smoothing relationship.

Yale University
and

University of California at Berkeley
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:

Note that the function V0 (V1; y1), which gives the Pareto frontier of the set of
all SPE payoffs (for feasible V1 ), is differentiable on the interior of its domain (the
interval

[o, V1 (y1)]

such that V0 (V1; y1) ~ 0) because u(c) is concave and differentiable

and the set of paths QP is convex and compact. We can form the Lagrangian for the
concave programming problem for finding s( u*) with multipliers, /Jp, q,, and /Jp, f//, for
the constraints V0 ~ 0 and V1 ~ 0, respectively, for each state

Ak for the constraint

The necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum are

We define £k and ck by
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Yt+i

=y',

and multiplier

Recall that V0 (V1; y) is downward-sloping and strictly concave.
The first-order conditions imply that
ifV0 (w1 ,y')=0, then

(i)

u'(c(w1_ 1,yk )) = (1 + q,,)u'(c(w 1 ,y'))
;::: u'(c(w 1 ,y')),

so that c(w1_ 1 , yk) ~ c(wt' y') =£',where w 1 = (w1-1, yk).
if v1 (w1 , y') = 0, then

(ii)

so that c(w1_ 1,yk);=::c(w1 ,y')=c',
and (iii) if both V0 and V1 exceed zero in state l after history wt, then

( y') _< _,
c .
_cwt'
-c (wt> y') , where£ ' <
c (wt-i• yk)To show that cN > cN-i >... > c 1 and £N > £N-i >... > £1 , we use a contradiction.
Assume m~ {cj} :J: cN. We have by definition, (yN - cN) + /3E(V1 let= cN) = 0, where
J

the expression E(V1 let = cN) is well-defined by the necessary conditions above. By
these conditions, we also know that E(V0 1ct = cN) > 0 if ck> cN for some k.
Therefore, yN -cN <0, and (yk -ck)+/3E(V1 lct =ck)=0.
Let ck= m~ {cj}, so that the first-order conditions imply that E(Yilct =ck)= 0.
J

Therefore yk = ck . But ck > cN > yN implies that yk > yN, a contradiction.
Next, take cN-i and assume that 3k :J: N such that ck> cN-i.
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We have

/3E(V1 let = cN-l) > 0 by the first-order conditions and yk < yN-l. This contradicts the

assumption that both sides of the inequality are zero.
By repetition of the argument, we have that cj S ck whenever j < k. To show that cj
is strictly less than ck when yj < yk, suppose that cj = ck . The first order conditions
imply that

But, both

1
2
cannot hold since y; < yk . Therefore, we have the order c < c <... cN, and by a
1
symmetric argument using V0 , that f < ~/ <...< f N.

To show that yN = cN, note that cN = m~ {c;} implies that E(V1lct = cN) = 0, so that
J

1

yN = cN, and, similarly, y
Because

=f

1

•

'½ (wt, yk) ~ 0 fo · every state

k and each i

=

0, 1, the equations,

(yk - ck)+ /3E(V1 let =ck)= 0 and u(fk )- u(yk) + /3E(V0 1ct = fk) =0, imply that
_k
C

<
c tior every k - 1,...., N .
_ -k
_ yk <
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FOOTNOTES

1 Lindert and Morton (1989) examined 1552 external bonds of ten borrowing governments

(approximately the top ten borrowers over the past 30 years) including those outstanding in 1850 or
floated between then and 1970, following all through to settlement or the end of 1983. Defaults
were not only common but widespread in their sample; most of the countries had some defaults in
each of the periods 1820-1929 and the 1930s (Figure 2.2 p. 61). A detailed summary of experience by
country is presented in their Table 2.8 pp. 92-98.
2Eichengreen and Portes (1989b) examined 125 London overseas issues and a sample of 250 United
States foreign issues floated in the 1920s. (Nearly half of the latter, by value, lapsed into default (p.
233)). In their samples British bonds had an overall internal rate of return of 5 percent, higher than
domestic investments, (Eichengreen and Portes 1989a p. 77) while United States loans to national
governments had an internal rate of return of 4.6 percent, compared to the 4.1 percent yield on United
States treasury bonds over the 1920s (pp. 35, 38). These yields were, however, substantially below
those offered ex ante, which were generally between 7 and 8 percent (p. 27). Overall the bonds in the
Lindert and Morton (1989) sample proved profitable; the average 2 percent ex ante premium over
domestic government bonds became a 0.42 percent premium ex post (p. 77). Further, they find (p. 56)
that "there is no clear evidence of a systematic difference in realized returns" between the bonds of
their ten borrower governments and United States domestic-corporate bonds.
3Eichengreen and Portes (1989b p. 234) report that, in their 1920s samples, "The typical default
reduced the internal rate of return by 4.3 percent for dollar loans, but by 1.4 to 2.3 percent on
sterling loans." They note, for example, that all sterling loans to Brazil in that period went into
default, but they yielded positive internal rates of return between 1.1 and 2.3 percent.
4For an early expression of this view, see Wallich (1943) The term "excusable default" is from
Grossman and Van Huyck (1988).

The insight that "defaults" might not always violate the

underlying equilibrium relationship helps explain the findings of Lindert and Morton (1989) and
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Eichengreen (1989) that defaulters have not generally suffered subsequent discrimination in credit
terms, and also the finding of Ozier (1988) for loans 1968-81 that the average penalty for past
defaults, though statistically significant, was only a small fraction of the spread.
5Diaz-Alejandro (1983) illuminates the differential treatment of Britain and the United States by
Brazil and Argentina in the 1930s. Each preferentially repaid the country with which she had a large
net trade surplus, and therefore greater concern with market access. For other cases see Bulow and
Rogoff (1989a).
6If

the lender can make credible commitments, he can offer an insurance contract which, in some

states, forces him to pay more than the expected present value of future net payments to him. This
case, in which no long-run relationship need arise, is examined under symmetric information by
Worrall (1990) and for asymmetric information by Atkeson (1988).
7Other studies assume asymmetric information about a borrower's aggregate debts, (Kietzer 1984),
the borrower's attributes (e.g. Cole, Dow and English (1989), Eaton (1989), and Kietzer (1989)) or
the borrower's actions (e.g. Atkeson (1988), who also assumes full pre-commitment to state
contingent payments on the part of lenders with two-period lives). For a critical evaluation of the
importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in international lending see Eaton, Gersovitz and
Stiglitz (1986) and Kietzer (1987).

Kietzer (1989) also discusses seniority privileges in a

consumption-smoothing model at length and examines properties of equilibria in a version of this
model with an exogenous distribution of bargaining power assumed.
8Hart and Moore (1988) study a model in which the players renegotiate an incomplete contract for
the exchange for a single unit of a good under uncertainty. Each player can insist on exogenous
enforcement of the existing contract, and renegotiation occurs when there are gains from trade that
will not be realized under the contract. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the surplus attained through
renegotiation is not divided between the players as in a strategic Nash bargaining game; in one version,
it all goes to the player who is willing to trade under the terms of the existing contract. In our
model, there is no external enforcement and payments are made to ensure future cooperation by the
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other player; the value of such cooperative play depends upon the equilibrium strategies being
followed. The division of the surplus in the relationship varies with the history of play and of
nature.
9This legal provision ensures that the consumption-smoothing arrangement does not "unravel" in
the fashion demonstrated by Bulow and Rogoff (1989b). This strong assumption is sufficient but not
necessary.

In an extension of this paper (Kietzer and Wright (1990)) we shall show that the

equilibrium derived here can be supported by renegotiation-proof punishments if there is no legal
protection of this type for any agent.
1°"rhe literature on credit markets has emphasized informational imperfections for motivating the
use of standard (non-state-contingent) debt contracts in one-period models with risk-aversion and
uncertainty (see, for example, Diamond (1984) or Gale and Hellwig (1985)). An assumption such as
costly verification of the borrower's endowment is not needed to assure that simple debt contracts are
efficient in our model of a long-term debtor-creditor relationship.
11 see for example, Farrell (1983), Farrell and Maskin (1989), Pearce (1987), Abreu and Pearce
(1989), and also Asheim (1988), van Damme (1989), Bergin and MacLeod (1989), and Benoit and
Krishna (1988) among others.
12Bernheim and Ray (1989) also suggest a definition of renegotiation-proofness, called internal
consistency, which coincides with weak renegotiation-proofness.
13 Evans and Maskin (1989) prove that for generic two-person finite stage-games, an efficient
weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists for the infinitely repeated game for low discount rates.
14It can be shown that any path in QP can be generated by a strategy profile in

l?

which is a

consistent bargaining equilibrium. In general, these profiles will use punishments that are Pareto
unranked with

qO and q1 •

15other punishments than

q0 and q1 yielding payoffs on

the frontier of

W(y)

are possible if the

discount factor is close enough to one. These are the cases in which full smoothing of the borrower's
consumption is possible in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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16 It follows that an agent deviates only in states in which he or she would make a positive transfer
under the simple strategy profile, given the history h.
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